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Abstract
Ensuring differential privacy of models learned from sensitive user data is an important goal
that has been studied extensively in recent years. It is now known that for some basic learning
problems, especially those involving high-dimensional data, producing an accurate private model
requires much more data than learning without privacy. At the same time, in many applications
it is not necessary to expose the model itself. Instead users may be allowed to query the
prediction model on their inputs only through an appropriate interface. Here we formulate the
problem of ensuring privacy of individual predictions and investigate the overheads required to
achieve it in several standard models of classification and regression.
We first describe a simple baseline approach based on training several models on disjoint
subsets of data and using standard private aggregation techniques to predict. We show that
this approach has nearly optimal sample complexity for (realizable) PAC learning of any class of
Boolean functions. At the same time, without strong assumptions on the data distribution, the
aggregation step introduces a substantial overhead. We demonstrate that this overhead can be
avoided for the well-studied class of thresholds on a line and for a number of standard settings of
convex regression. The analysis of our algorithm for learning thresholds relies crucially on strong
generalization guarantees that we establish for all differentially private prediction algorithms.
1 Introduction and problem formulation
In machine learning tasks, the training data often consists of information collected from individuals.
This data can be highly sensitive, for example in the case of medical or financial information, and
therefore privacy-preserving data analysis is becoming an increasingly important area of study in
machine learning, data mining and statistics [DS09; SC13; DR14]. We rely on the well-studied
differential privacy model of privacy that has become a de facto standard for formal understanding
of privacy [DMNS06].
The standard setting of privacy-preserving learning aims to ensure that the model learned from
the data is produced in a differently private way. Thus this approach preserves privacy even when
a potential adversary has complete access to the description of the predictive model. The downside
of this strong guarantee is that for some learning problems, achieving the guarantee is known to
have substantial additional costs. More examples are needed to achieve the same level of accuracy
(or lower accuracy is achievable for a given number of examples). In addition, private learning may
require new and computationally less efficient algorithms.
In this work we consider learning in a setting where the description of the learned model is
not accessible to the (potentially adversarial) user(s). Instead the users have access to the model
through an interface (often referred to as an API). For an input point the interface provides the
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value of the predictive model on that point. This view is appropriate for many existing applications
where user privacy is a concern. For example, companies that collect data about their users usually
expose only a cloud-based interface to the models they train on user data. Credit rating bureaus
only allow access to their models through an electronic interface. In addition, it may enable new
applications where privacy considerations are currently preventing the use of predictive models
trained on sensitive user data. For example, in medical diagnostics a prediction interface would
suffice for most applications.
Allowing such restricted access may appear to pose no risk to individual privacy. However,
as recently demonstrated by Shokri et al. [SSSS17], blackbox access to Amazon ML and Google
prediction APIs suffice for successful membership inference attacks. Membership inference is the
task in which given a user’s record the goal is to infer whether the record was used for training
the model. This information is known to be sensitive in several contexts. Membership inference
can also be used to complete partial records revealing the values of sensitive attributes. Even more
recently, Long et al. [Lon+18] demonstrated several additional successful membership inference
attacks based on blackbox access. Further, Carlini et al. [CLKES18] proposed a more formal way
to measure the degree to which sensitive information is memorized by generative sequence models
and explored several techniques to extract sensitive information using black box access to such
models. The use of differentially private learning algorithms to protect against such attacks has
been proposed in [SSSS17] and briefly explored in [CLKES18].
We now describe the setting more formally. For a prediction problem over a domain X and
label space Y , a prediction interface is an algorithm that has access to a dataset S ∈ (X ×Y )n and
given a query point x ∈ X outputs a value y ∈ Y . The algorithm can be queried multiple times
and is stateful (namely, responses can depend on previous queries). We define the privacy of such
an interface in the same way as usually done for interactive algorithms. Namely, for a prediction
interface M and a stateful query generating algorithm Q we denote by (Q⇄M(S)) the sequence
of queries and responses generated in the interaction of Q and M on dataset S.
Definition 1.1 (Private prediction interface). A prediction interface M , is (ǫ, δ)-differentially
private if for every interactive query generating algorithm Q, the output (Q ⇄ M(S)) is (ǫ, δ)-
differentially private with respect to dataset S.
While the problem setting has many facets that merit investigation, we focus on perhaps the
most basic question: what is the cost of ensuring privacy of a single prediction. In other words, we
focus on the problem of answering a single prediction query. Composition properties of differential
privacy imply that such an algorithm can be used to answer multiple queries with privacy param-
eters that degrade gracefully with the number of queries [DR14]. Therefore such an algorithm is a
natural building block for constructing an algorithm that can answer multiple queries. Naturally,
better ways of dealing with sequences of queries might exist and the general topic of answering
interactive sequences of queries has been studied extensively in the differential privacy literature
(see [DR14] for an overview).
An algorithm M that answers a single query x defines a randomized prediction at x and hence
such an algorithm implicitly defines a learning algorithm that outputs a randomized predictor
h(x) =M(S, x).
Definition 1.2. Let M be an algorithm that given a dataset S ∈ (X × Y )n and a point x produces
a value in Y . We say that M is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private prediction algorithm if for every x ∈ X,
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the output M(S, x) is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private with respect to S. We use M(S) to refer to the
(randomized) function M(S, ·).
This definition allows us to treat this building block in the same way as regular learning algo-
rithms and discuss it in the context of standard statistical learning models.
Two standard and closely related models for classification we will look at are PAC (or realizable)
learning [Val84] and agnostic [Hau92; KSS94] learning. In the PAC learning model the algorithm
is given random examples in which each point is sampled i.i.d. from some unknown distribution
over the domain and is labeled by an unknown function from a set of functions C. In the agnostic
learning model the algorithm is given examples sampled i.i.d. from an arbitrary (and unknown)
distribution over labeled points. The goal of the learning algorithm in both models is to output a
hypothesis whose prediction error on the distribution from which examples are sampled is within
additive α of the prediction error of the best function in C (which is 0 in the PAC model). See
Sec. 3 for formal definitions.
We will also consider a more general regression setting in which we are given a loss function
ℓ : R× Y → R and the goal is to design a private prediction algorithm M that minimizes
EP [ℓ(M(S)] = E
M,(x,y)∼P
[ℓ(M(S, x), y)],
where P is an unknown probability distribution over X × Y .
2 Overview of the results
We first consider a natural “baseline” approach to this problem based on private aggregation of
non-private learning algorithms.
2.1 Private aggregation of non-private models
To produce a prediction differentially privately we partition the dataset S into several subsamples
S1, . . . , Sr and run a non-private learning algorithm on each of those subsamples too obtain pre-
dictors f1, . . . , fr. Now given a point x we use a differentially private aggregation technique on
values f1(x), . . . , fr(x) and output the result. Several such subsample-and-aggregate techniques are
known [NRS07; DL09; ST13; DR14] that carefully exploit properties of the distribution over results
on subsamples. A significant advantage of this approach is that it does not require a new learning
algorithm and hence is easy to implement (there is an additional computational cost that is easy
to parallelize).
Obviously, using r subsamples requires more data than non-private learning and therefore it
is natural to ask whether this approach is optimal and how it compares to differentially private
learning in the standard setting. We discuss these questions in the context of specific problems
below.
PAC Learning: For PAC learning (or realizable case) accurate models f1, . . . , fr have to be close
to the true labeling function f (that is, they disagree with probability at most α). In particular, the
fraction of points on which more than 1/4 of the predictors output the wrong label cannot be more
than 4α. Outputting the correct label with privacy is easy in this setting and we do this using
a soft majority vote (or, equivalently, the exponential mechanism [MT07] on the label counts).
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A number of other approaches would give comparable guarantees. A simple analysis shows that
using r = O(ln(1/α)/ǫ) this reduction ensures ǫ-differentially private prediction (see Thm. 4.1 for
a formal statement).
As an immediate corollary of this reduction and standard bounds on the sample complexity of
PAC learning we obtain the following upper bound.
Corollary 2.1. Let C be a class of Boolean functions of VC dimension d. Then for all α, β, ǫ > 0,
there exists an ǫ-differentially private prediction algorithm M that PAC learns C with error α and
confidence 1− β given n = O˜
(
d+log(1/β)
ǫα
)
examples.
It turns out that this simple approach is essentially optimal in the worst case. Specifically, we
prove that the sample complexity of this problem is Ω(d/(ǫα)) even when δ is as large as ǫ/3.
Theorem 2.2. Let C be a class of Boolean functions of VC dimension d. Then for all α, ǫ > 0, any
(ǫ, ǫ/3)-differentially private prediction algorithm M that PAC learns C with error α and confidence
1/12 requires n = Ω(d/(ǫα)) examples.
For comparison, Kasiviswanathan et al. [KLNRS11] showed that the sample complexity of
differentially privately PAC learning a class C over domain X is O(log(|C|)/(ǫα)). By Sauer’s
lemma, log(|C|) = O(d · log(|X|)) and therefore the multiplicative gap between these two measures
can be as large as log(|X|). The sample complexity of ǫ-differentially private PAC learning was
subsequently shown to be Θ˜(R/(ǫα)), where R is the so-called representation dimension of C
[BNS13]. However, as shown in [FX15], for many classes the gap between R and the VC dimension
is still roughly log(|X|). For example, the representation dimension of linear threshold functions
over [N ]p is p2 · logN whereas the VC dimension is just p.
We remark that the technique we use to prove the lower bound in Thm. 2.2 is different from
those used for proving lower bounds in the standard setting of learning with privacy.
Agnostic learning: In agnostic learning, the labels f1(x), . . . , fr(x) no do not necessarily agree
on most points x and taking the majority vote may even reduce the accuracy. In this setting we
predict by first averaging the non-private predictions to obtain v(x) = 1r (f1(x) + · · · + fr(x)) and
then outputting 1 with probability v(x) + ζ (truncated to range [0, 1]), where ζ is a Laplace noise
variable. It is not hard to show that for r = O(1/(ǫα)), this approach ensures that the prediction
will be ǫ-differentially private and the addition of noise increases the prediction error by at most an
extra α term (see Cor. 4.7). As a corollary of this reduction, we obtain the following upper-bound
on the sample complexity in this setting.
Corollary 2.3. Let C be a class of Boolean functions of VC dimension d. Then for all α, β, ǫ > 0
there exists an ǫ-differentially private prediction algorithm M that agnostically learns C with excess
error α and confidence 1− β given n = O˜
(
d+log(1/β)
ǫα3
)
examples.
In this case the upper bound is much worse than the lower bound of Ω(d/α2 + d/(ǫα)) implied
by Thm. 2.2. For comparison, ǫ-differentially private agnostic learning can be done using O˜(d/α2+
R/(ǫα)) examples, where R is the representation dimension of C mentioned above [BNS13; FX15].
As a result, for classes such that R = O(d) a differentially private learning algorithm matches the
lower bound for private prediction. This leads to a natural question of whether it is possible to
match the lower bound for all classes C. While we do not answer this question for arbitrary classes
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C, we give an example of an algorithm that goes beyond these two approaches. Specifically, it
agnostically learns C with ǫ-private prediction using O˜(d/α2 + d/(ǫα)) examples whereas learning
C with privacy in the standard model requires an infinite number of examples.
Convex regression: Our analysis of agnostic learning can be seen as a special case of a more
general analysis of prediction problems with convex loss functions. Specifically, the aggregation by
averaging can be seen as a way to increase the uniform prediction stability of a learning algorithm.
A learning algorithm is uniformly prediction stable with rate γ if for predictors fS and fS′ produced
on any pair of datasets S, S′ that differ on a single element and any point x, |fS(x)− fS′(x)| ≤ γ.
As follows immediately from this definition, a uniformly prediction stable learning algorithm can be
converted to a differentially private prediction algorithm simply by adding Laplace (or Gaussian)
noise to the prediction (see Lem. 4.5). Hence it reduces our problem to the problem of finding a
uniformly prediction stable learning algorithm with sufficiently low rate of stability. Aggregation
by averaging the predictors obtained by running a learning algorithm on r disjoint datasets can be
seen as improving its uniform prediction stability by a factor of r. Convexity of the loss function,
in turn, ensures that such averaging preserves the guarantees on the expected loss of the algorithm
(see Lem. 4.6 for a formal statement).
We demonstrate how this general approach can be applied to convex regression problems. Specif-
ically, we consider problems in which we have a family of predictors {f(w, ·)}w∈K parameterized by
a vector w ∈ K, where K ⊂ Rd is some convex body, ℓ is a convex loss function and ℓ(f(·, x), y) is
a convex function of w over K for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y . The goal is to find wˆ such that
E
(x,y)∼P
[ℓ(f(wˆ, x), y)] ≤ min
w∈K E(x,y)∼P
[ℓ(f(w, x), y)] + α,
where P is an unknown distribution over examples. This setting captures many important learning
problems and has also been extensively investigated in the privacy literature (see [CMS11; KST12;
BST14; TTZ15; WYX17] and references therein). For the purpose of comparison with sample
complexity bounds known in this literature we restrict our attention to a basic setting in which K
is a subset of the unit Euclidean ball and ℓ(f(w, x), y) is 1-Lipschitz in w for all (x, y) in support of P.
For this setting it is known that O˜(d/(ǫα2)) samples suffice to solve the problem with ǫ-differential
privacy and O˜(
√
d log4(1/δ)/(ǫα2)) samples suffice for (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy [BST14]. Further,
such dependence on the dimension is optimal in both settings [BST14].
The dependence on the dimension is not necessary for non-private learning in this setting. In
addition, we can exploit known stability analyses to reduce (or even eliminate) the need to use the
aggregation step. By plugging the known stability results based on strong convexity and/or [BE02;
SSSSS10; HRS16], we demonstrate that convex regression problems of this type can be solved with
ǫ-differentially private prediction using O(1/(ǫα2)) examples (Cor. 4.11). We also demonstrate that
smoothness of the loss function ℓ can be used to improve the dependence on ǫ (Cor. 4.13). We
note that stability of the optimal solution of a strongly convex problem has been used to achieve
differential privacy in multiple prior works starting with the pioneering work of Chaudhuri et al.
[CMS11]. Stability of gradient descent on convex smooth functions has also been recently used to
obtain privacy guarantees [WLKCJN17].
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2.2 Beyond aggregation: learning thresholds
The class of linear thresholds Thr is defined over a subset of reals and consists of indicator functions
of “x ≥ a” for all a ∈ R. Without loss of generality, we consider such functions over the set
[N ] = {1, . . . , N}. While the class is very simple, learning it with privacy has proved to be rather
challenging and some basic questions are still not fully resolved [BKN10; CH11; BNS13; FX15;
BNSV15]. It is known that ǫ-differentially private PAC learning of Thr requires Ω(log(N)/(ǫα))
examples [FX15] and proper (ǫ, δ) differentially private PAC learning requires Ω(log∗(N)/(ǫα))
examples [BNSV15] (no lower bounds for non-proper learning and δ > 0 case are known). Note
that the VC dimension of this class is just 1.
We give an ǫ-differentially private prediction algorithm for agnostic learning of this class with
the following guarantee:
Theorem 2.4. For any α, ǫ > (0, 1] and N ∈ N, there exists an ǫ-differentially private prediction
algorithm M that given n ≥ 12 ln(2/α)αǫ examples from an arbitrary distribution P over [N ] × {0, 1}
guarantees:
E
S∼Pn
[ErrP(M(S))] ≤ eǫ · (OptP(Thr) + α).
Note that this statement implies an upper bound of n = O(ln(1/α)/(αǫ)) in the realizable case
when OptP(Thr) = 0 and also an upper bound of n = O(ln(1/α)/(αǫ)+ln(1/α)/α2) in the agnostic
setting. The O˜(1/α2) term arises from having to set ǫ < α to ensure that the expected error is at
most OptP(Thr)+O(α). Our algorithm can also handle unions of k intervals (at the expense of an
additional factor k in the sample complexity).
At a high level our algorithm works as follows. First, the examples are sorted. To determine
the probability with which to output 1 on point x the algorithm traverses the examples on points
smaller than x in increasing order. Starting from bias 1/2 the algorithm increases or decreases the
current bias by a factor of (roughly) eǫ for each example it traverses. The bias is increased if the
label of the example is 1 and decreased otherwise. Importantly, the bias is projected back to the
interval [α, 1−α] after each update. The algorithm outputs 1 with probability obtained at the end
of this process. While the prediction privacy of our algorithm is relatively easy to establish, the
analysis of its error is more delicate and we are not aware of similar algorithms having been proposed
for this problem. Furthermore, our analysis only bounds the empirical error of this algorithm. The
hypothesis produced by the algorithm is sufficiently complicated that it would not be possible to
ensure generalization using VC dimension or similar techniques. Remarkably, the fact that our
algorithm is prediction private allows us to prove that it generalizes.
2.3 Generalization
It has been known for a while that differential privacy is a notion of stability and hence implies
bounds on the expectation of generalization error. Recent work in the context of adaptive data
analysis has substantially strengthened this connection, proving that differential privacy ensures
generalization with high probability [DFHPRR14; BNSSSU16; FS17]. Prediction privacy can also
be seen as a notion of stability that is weaker than differential privacy but stronger than uniform
prediction stability. We show how to derive relatively strong generalization guarantees from this
notion of stability. These guarantees are stronger than those known for classical notions of stability
(e.g. [BE02; SSSSS10]) but not as strong as those proved for differential privacy. Specifically, our
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generalization results (Lem. 6.4) imply that for every non-negative loss function ℓ, a moment k ≥ 1,
and an ǫ-differentially private prediction algorithm M :
E
S,S′∼Pn,
[
(ES′ [ℓ(M(S))])k
]
≤ ek2ǫ · E
S∼Pn
[
(ES [ℓ(M(S))])k
]
,
where ES[ℓ(M(S)] denotes the expected empirical loss of M(S) on S. Note that on the left hand
side we are bounding the average loss on an independently drawn set of examples S′ which is
tightly concentrated around the expected loss EP [ℓ(M(S)]. For comparison, ǫ-differential privacy
gives a similar bound with ekǫ factor instead of ek
2ǫ [DFHPRR14]. The bound above is stated using
the k = 1 version of this result. However this generalization bound implies that loss is also well
concentrated. In Lemma 6.5 and Theorem 5.3 we give an example of how to derive high probability
bounds on the generalization error from this moment bound.
2.4 Related work
Pathak et al. [PRR10] consider secure and differentially private aggregation of non-private linear
models held by multiple mistrusting parties. They achieve it by computing the average model and
adding noise to it. They do not consider accuracy guarantees of their approach formally.
To the best of our knowledge, the privacy-preserving aggregation of non-private predictions to
produce privacy-preserving predictions was first investigated by Bilenko, Dwork, Muthukrishnan,
Rothblum, Thakurta and Wang in 20141. Bilenko et al. , obtained high levels of composition by
exploiting the frequently high degree of (near) consensus among the predictions of the non-private
models via a variant of the sparse-vector technique [DR14]. Our work shares the same goal of
generating differentially private predictions. At the same time we formalize the general problem
of learning with differentially private predictions and focus on the sample complexity of making
a single prediction. In addition, we demonstrate approaches that go beyond privacy-preserving
aggregation.
Aggregation of non-private models to produce labels while preserving privacy was also used in
recent works of Hamm et al. [HCB16] and, subsequently, Papernot et al. [PAEGT17] and Paper-
not et al. [PSMRTE18] to give a new semi-supervised approach to differentially private learning.
Specifically, their approach is predicated on availability of public unlabeled dataset Z. The dataset
Z is labeled using differentially-private aggregation of labels provided by models trained on the
sensitive dataset S. The labeled data is used to train a new model. Since differential privacy is
closed under post-processing, this new model is privacy-preserving for S (but not for Z). The works
of Papernot et al. [PAEGT17; PSMRTE18] deal primarily with techniques for accurately bounding
the privacy parameters while ensuring accurate prediction on benchmark datasets. Hamm et al.
[HCB16] also formally examine additional error that noisy aggregation introduces and explicitly
rely on stability of strongly-convex regression problems to provide formal guarantees for their ap-
proach. Their framework and the guarantees are incomparable to ours, and, in particular, they do
not avoid dependence on the dimension.
In a recent and independent work, Bassily et al. [BTT18] consider the formal guarantees
for answering a sequence of prediction queries using differentially private aggregation techniques.
They demonstrate that given a non-private learning algorithm has error of at most α (such as in
1This was the core of a larger project on privacy-preserving click prediction that did not survive the closing of the
Silicon Valley lab.
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the PAC model), there exists an algorithm that answers m prediction queries for points chosen
i.i.d. from the same distribution with error O(α) and privacy parameter ǫ scaling as
√
mα · logm
(for comparison, a direct application of composition theorems for differential privacy implies
√
m
scaling for an arbitrary sequence of queries). They then analyze the sample complexity of semi-
supervised (or, equivalently, label-private) learning algorithm that is obtained by labeling a public
unlabeled dataset using their algorithm for answering prediction queries.
We remark that all these works do not examine the problem of private prediction itself and
focus on the aggregation-based approaches. Recall that in private prediction, it is the privacy of
the training data for the predictor (model) that is being protected.
Organization: In Section 4.1 we provide additional details of our results for PAC learning. Re-
sults for agnostic learning and convex regression appear in Section 4.2. Section 5 formally describes
our algorithm for agnostic learning of thresholds and unions of intervals. We discuss the general-
ization properties of private prediction in Section 6.
3 Preliminaries
Differential privacy Differential privacy [DMNS06] relies on bounding the divergence between
distributions output by the algorithm on neighboring datasets. Specifically, for two random vari-
ables U and V and δ > 0 the β-approximate max-divergence is defined as (e.g. [DR14]):
Dδ∞(U‖V ) .= sup
O⊆supp(U); Pr[U∈O]>δ
ln
Pr[U ∈ O]− δ
Pr[V ∈ O] .
A randomized algorithm M : Xn → Y is said to be (ǫ, δ)-differentially private if for all pairs
S, S′ ∈ Xn that differ on a single element, Dδ∞(M(S)‖M(S′)) ≤ ǫ. We note that our definitions
and many of the results can be immediately extended to more refined notions of differential privacy
such as those based on Renyi divergence [BS16; Mir].
The group privacy property of differential privacy (e.g. [DR14]) implies the that prediction
privacy has the analogous property.
Lemma 3.1 (Group privacy). Let M : (X × Y )n × X → Y be an (ǫ, δ)-differentially private
prediction algorithm and k ∈ N. For all pairs of data sets S, S′ ∈ (X × Y )n differing in at most k
elements and all x ∈ X:
Dke
ǫ(k−1)δ
∞ (M(S, x)‖M(S′, x)) ≤ kǫ .
3.1 Learning models
Definition 3.2. An algorithm A PAC learns a concept class C from n examples if for every
α > 0, β > 0, f ∈ C and distribution D over X, A given access to S = {(xi, ℓi)}i∈[n] where
each xi is drawn randomly and independently from D and ℓi = f(xi), outputs, with probability at
least 1 − β over the choice of S and the randomness of A, a function h : X → {0, 1} such that
Prx∼D[f(x) 6= h(x)] ≤ α.
For a Boolean function h and a distribution P over X×{0, 1} let ErrP(h) = Pr(x,ℓ)∼P [h(x) 6= ℓ].
Define OptP(C) = infh∈C{ErrP(h)}. Kearns et al. [KSS94] define agnostic learning as follows.
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Definition 3.3. An algorithm A agnostically learns a concept class C from n examples if for every
α > 0, β > 0, distribution P over X×{0, 1}, A, given access to S = {(xi, ℓi)}i∈[n] where each (xi, ℓi)
is drawn randomly and independently from P, outputs, with probability at least 1−β over the choice
of S and the randomness of A, a function h : X → {0, 1} such that ErrP(h) ≤ OptP(C) + α.
4 Prediction privacy via subsampling and uniform stability
In this section we describe two variants of the baseline approach to obtaining prediction privacy. The
baseline approach is based on a well-known observation that stability to replacement (or deletion) of
a point can be improved by partitioning the dataset S into several subsamples S1, . . . , Sℓ running a
learning algorithm on each of those subsamples to obtain predictors f1, . . . , fℓ and then aggregating
these predictors in a stable way. The first variant we describe is specialized to the simpler realizable
case of classification. The second one is a generic model averaging that works for arbitrary convex
loss functions. This case can also be used to obtain guarantees for agnostic learning of Boolean
functions. In this case we will also explicitly use uniform prediction stability properties of the
algorithm to derive its privacy guarantees.
4.1 PAC Learning
Our algorithm for PAC learning applies a soft majority rule to the outputs of f1, . . . , fr. Specifically,
on a point x it will output a label b with probability proportional to eǫ|{i∈[r]:fi(x)=b}|. This approach
works well for PAC learning since all predictors agree very well with the true labeling function. In
particular, if each of the predictors has error of at most α, then the fraction of points on which
more than 1/4 of the predictors output the wrong label cannot be more than 4α. Therefore the
prediction of the soft majority will be close to the true label on all but the 4α fraction of the points.
Theorem 4.1. Let C be a class of Boolean functions over X. Let A be a PAC learning algorithm
for C that uses m(α, β) samples to learn with error α and confidence parameter β. For every
ǫ > 0, there exists an ǫ-differentially private prediction algorithm M that PAC learns C using
n = r ·m(α/4, β/r) examples, where r = ⌈6 ln(4/α)/ǫ⌉.
Proof. We denote by c ∈ C the unknown labeling function and by D the unknown distribution
over X. We let r = ⌈6 ln(4/α)/ǫ⌉ and n′ = m(α/4, β/t). Given a set S of n = r · n′ examples we
split them randomly into r disjoint subsets of size n′. We now run A with error parameter set to
α/4 and confidence parameter to β/r on each of those sets to obtain r functions f1, . . . , fr. On an
input point x let v(S, x) = 2|{i ∈ [r] : fi(x) = 1}| − r. Our algorithm outputs 1 with probability
eǫv(S,x)/2
1+eǫv(x)/2
and 0 otherwise.
We first observe that M is an ǫ-differentially private prediction algorithm. This follows easily
from observing that changing a single example can change only a single function fi. Further, such
change can change the value v(S, x) by at most 2. Namely, for any pair of neighboring dataset
S, S′, |v(S, x) − v(S′, x)| ≤ 2. Now the privacy guarantees follow immediately from the definition
of the output distribution of our algorithm being as: output 1 with probability e
ǫ·v(S,x)/2
1+eǫ·v(S,x)/2
and 0
with probability 1
1+eǫ·v(S,x)/2
and the fact that for arbitrary real a, b,
ea
1+ea
eb
1+eb
= ea−b · 1 + e
b
1 + ea
≤ e|a−b| and 1 + e
b
1 + ea
≤ e|a−b|.
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We now analyze the accuracy of our algorithm. Using the union bound, we know that with
probability at least 1 − β, for every i ∈ [r], PrD[fi(x) 6= c(x)] = ED [|fi(x)− c(x)|] ≤ α/4. This
means that
E
D

∑
i∈[r]
|fi(x)− c(x)|

 ≤ αr/4.
By Markov’s inequality this implies that
Pr
D

∑
i∈[r]
|fi(x)− c(x)| ≥ r/3

 ≤ 3α/4. (1)
Now we claim that for every x such that
∑
i∈[r] |fi(x)−c(x)| ≤ r/3 we have that PrM [M(S, x) 6=
c(x)] ≤ α/4. If c(x) = 1 then
v(S, x) = 2(r −
∑
i∈[r]
|fi(x)− c(x)|) − r ≥ r
3
.
This implies that
Pr
M
[M(S, x) 6= 1] ≤ 1
1 + eǫr/6
≤ e−ǫr/6 ≤ e− ln(α/4) = α/4.
Similarly, if c(x) = 0 we get that v(S, x) ≤ −r/3 and PrM [M(S, x) 6= 0] ≤ α/4.
Combining the last claim with inequality (1) we obtain that PrD,M [c(x) 6=M(S, x)] ≤ α.
Standard bounds on the sample complexity of PAC learning (e.g. [KV94]) state that n =
O
(
d log(1/α)+log(1/β)
α
)
examples suffice to PAC learn a class C of VC dimension d. Plugging this
into our reduction we obtain that for every concept class C there exists a differentially private
prediction algorithm that PAC learns the class C given n = O˜(d/(ǫα)) examples.
Corollary 4.2 (Cor. 2.1 restated). Let C be a class of Boolean functions of VC dimension d. Then
for all α, β, ǫ > 0 there exists an ǫ-differentially private prediction algorithm M that PAC learns C
with error α and confidence 1− β given n = O
(
d log2(1/α)+log(1/α) log(log(1/α)/(ǫβ))
ǫα
)
examples.
We demonstrate that this upper bound is essentially tight.
Theorem 4.3 (Thm. 2.2 restated). Let C be a class of Boolean functions of VC dimension d.
Then for all α, ǫ > 0, any (ǫ, ǫ/3)-differentially private prediction algorithm M that PAC learns C
with error α and confidence 1/12 requires n ≥ d/(32ǫα) examples.
Proof. We first deal with the case α = 1/4. The reduction to general α is standard and is briefly
described below.
Let a1, . . . , ad ∈ X be the set of points shattered by C. For convenience we refer to these points
as {1, 2, . . . , d}. For a vector b = (b1, . . . , bd) ∈ {0, 1}d we denote by fb the function in C that
satisfies: for all i ∈ [d], fb(i) = bi. Let D be the uniform distribution over [d].
Let M be the (ǫ, ǫ/3)-differentially private prediction algorithm for learning C. Now consider
the expected prediction accuracy of M on a point i ∈ [d], where the expectation is taken over the
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following process: b ∈ {0, 1}d is chosen randomly, a dataset of size n is generated from D labeled
by fb and then M is run on S and i. Namely,
pi
.
= Pr
b∼{0,1}d,S∼(D,fb)n,M
[M(S, i) 6= bi].
The accuracy and confidence guarantees of M imply that
E
i∼D
[pi] = E
b∼{0,1}d, S∼(D,fb)n
[
E
i∼D
[
Pr
M
[M(S, i) 6= bi]
]]
≤ α+ β = 1
4
+
1
12
=
1
3
.
This means that there exists i such that pi ≤ 1/3 and we fix i to this value for the rest of the
argument.
Let S⊕i denote the dataset in which all the examples for point i have their label flipped. By
group prediction privacy of M (Lemma 3.1) we know that for every v ∈ {0, 1},
Pr[M(S, i) = v] ≤ eǫtPr
M
[M(S⊕i, i) = v] + te(t−1)ǫδ,
where t is the number of points i in the dataset.
Now if we assume, for the sake of contradiction, that n ≤ d/(8ǫ) then (for d larger than some
fixed constant) with probability at least 1/24 over the choice of S, S includes at most s
.
= 1/(4ǫ)
points equal to i. Using that eǫs = e1/4 ≤ 3/2 and δ = ǫ/3, this implies that
Pr
S∼(D,fb)n,M
[M(S, i) = v] ≤ eǫs Pr
S∼(D,fb)n,M
[M(S⊕i, i) = v] + s · e(s−1)ǫδ + 1
24
<
3
2
· Pr
S∼(D,fb)n,M
[M(S⊕i, i) = v] +
1
4ǫ
· 3
2
· ǫ
3
+
1
24
=
3
2
· Pr
S∼(D,fb)n,M
[M(S⊕i, i) = v] +
1
6
. (2)
Observe that for every b and S ∼ (D, fb)n, S⊕i is distributed identically to S ∼ (D, fb⊕i)n. This
implies that,
Pr
b∼{0,1}d, S∼(D,fb)n,M
[M(S⊕i, i) = bi] = Pr
b∼{0,1}d,S∼(D,f
b⊕i
)n,M
[M(S, i) = bi]
= Pr
b∼{0,1}d,S∼(D,fb)n,M
[M(S, i) 6= bi]
= pi. (3)
By plugging equations (2) and (3) into the definition of pi we obtain that:
1− pi = Pr
b∼{0,1}d,S∼(D,fb)n,M
[M(S, i) = bi]
<
3
2
· Pr
b∼{0,1}d,S∼(D,fb)n,M
[M(S⊕i, i) = bi] + 1/6
=
3
2
· pi + 1/6.
This cannot hold when pi ≤ 1/3, implying that n > d/(8ǫ).
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Finally we reduce the general α case to the analysis for α = 1/4 in the standard way (e.g. [KV94;
SSBD14]). We let Dα be the distribution that outputs the point with index d, with probability
1 − 4α and outputs a uniformly and randomly chosen i ∈ [d − 1] with probability 4α. Achieving
error of α on Dα requires achieving error of 1/4 on the uniform distribution on [d − 1]. Only
approximately 4α fraction of the examples will be useful for obtaining low error relative to the
uniform distribution on [d− 1] and therefore the reduction multiplies the lower bound by Ω(1/α).
More formally, we consider only target functions fb where bd = 0. Therefore for all target functions,
examples on point d will be identical. Now given that n ≤ d/(32αǫ), (and for d larger than some
fixed constant) with probability at least 1/24 over the choice of S ∼ (Dα, fb)n, S includes at most
1/(4ǫ) points equal to i as before. Hence the rest of the argument is essentially identical.
4.2 Learning with convex losses and stability
We now deal with the general setting of minimizing convex losses. Specifically, these are problems
in which the goal is to minimize the expected loss function E(x,y)∼P [ℓ(f(x), y)], where ℓ is a convex
function in the first parameter. Note that learning of Boolean functions is a special case in which
we use ℓ(a, b) = |a− b|.
To deal with this case we will rely on (non-private) learning algorithms that are prediction
stable in the usual numerical sense. That is
Definition 4.4. A learning algorithm A is uniform replace-one (RO) prediction stable with rate γ
if for all datasets S, S′ ∈ (X × Y )n that differ in a single element and any x ∈ X,
|A(S, x)−A(S′, x)| ≤ γ,
where A(S, ·) denotes the function output by A on dataset S.
This notion is closely-related to the standard uniform replace-one stability [BE02; SSSSS10]
which bounds the change in loss |ℓ(A(S, x), y)−ℓ(A(S′, x), y)| ≤ γ for all x, y. Crucially, the analyses
of uniform loss stability that we are aware of implicitly prove bounds on prediction stability. Hence
such analyses can be adapted to our applications (we provide some examples below).
Low sensitivity of the value predicted at each point implies that addition of Laplace or Gaussian
noise suffices to obtain a differentially private prediction algorithm. The additional error due to
noise can be controlled for Lipschitz loss functions. Somewhat stronger bounds on the additional
error can be shown if the loss function is smooth (that is, its derivative is Lipschitz-bounded).
Lemma 4.5. Let ℓ : R×Y → R be a loss function convex in the first parameter. Let A be a uniform
RO prediction stable algorithm with rate γ. For every ǫ > 0, there exists an ǫ-differentially private
prediction algorithm M such that for every dataset S ∈ (X × Y )n and any probability distribution
P over X × Y :
1. if ℓ(·, y) is Lℓ-Lipschitz in the first parameter for all y ∈ Y then
E [ℓ(M(S))] ≤ E [ℓ(A(S))] + Lℓ · γ/ǫ.
2. if ℓ(·, y) is σ-smooth in the first parameter for all y ∈ Y then
E [ℓ(M(S))] ≤ E [ℓ(A(S))] + σ2γ2/ǫ2.
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Proof. Given S and x let v be the output of A on S applied to x. We output v + ζ, where ζ is
distributed according to Laplace distribution with scale ǫ/γ. By definition of uniform RO prediction
stability and standard properties of the Laplace noise addition (e.g. [DR14]), this algorithm is ǫ-
differentially private. To obtain the claimed upper bound on the expected loss observe that if ℓ is
Lℓ-Lipschitz then for any S, x and y,
E
M
[ℓ(A(S, x) + ζ, y)] ≤ ℓ(A(S, x), y) + E
M
[Lℓ · |ζ|] = ℓ(A(S, x), y) + Lℓ · γ/ǫ,
where we have used the fact that |ζ| is distributed according to an exponential distribution with
rate γ/ǫ. This upper bound holds pointwise and therefore for any distribution P over X × Y .
If ℓ is σ-smooth, then by the definition of smoothness: for any x and y,
ℓ(A(S, x) + ζ, y) ≤ ℓ(A(S, x), y) + ℓ′(A(S, x), y) · ζ + σ
2
· ζ2.
Using the fact that E[ζ] = 0 and E[ζ2] = 2γ2/ǫ2, we obtain
E
M
[ℓ(A(S, x) + ζ, y)] ≤ ℓ(A(S, x), y) + γ2σ/ǫ2.
Naturally, many learning algorithms are not sufficiently prediction stable to ensure that the
additional error due to noise is sufficiently small. However it is easy to see that it is possible
to amplify stability by averaging the predictions obtained on disjoint subsamples. Convexity of
the loss function then implies that such averaging will preserve the bounds on the expected loss.
Specifically, the following lemma follows immediately from the argument above.
Lemma 4.6. Let A be a learning algorithm that outputs a real-valued function on X, is uniform RO
prediction stable with rate γ and uses n samples. For any r ∈ N there exists a learning algorithm
A′ that is uniform RO prediction stable with rate γ′ = γ/r that uses n · r samples. Further, for
any loss function ℓ(·, ·) convex in the first parameter, if for a distribution P over X ×Y , A has the
guarantee that ES∼Pn [EP [ℓ(A(S))]] ≤ v for some value v that may depend on P and the parameters
of the learning problem then ES′∼Prn [EP [ℓ(A′(S′))]] ≤ v. Alternatively, if for some β > 0,
Pr
S∼Pn
[EP [ℓ(A(S))] ≥ v] ≤ β
then
Pr
S′∼Prn
[EP [ℓ(A′(S′))] ≥ v] ≤ rβ.
The running time of A′ is r times the running time of A.
4.3 Agnostic learning
We now spell out immediate corollary of Lemmas 4.6 and 4.5 to agnostic learning of Boolean
functions. Agnostic learning of Boolean functions reduces to learning of a real-valued function f
with absolute loss ℓ(a, y) = |y−a|. Note that a real-valued prediction f(x) can also be equivalently
thought of as predicting 1 with probability p, where p is equal to f(x) projected to the interval
[0, 1]. The expected disagreement of such prediction on y ∈ {0, 1} is upper bounded by |y − f(x)|.
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This loss function is convex and 1-Lipschitz in the first parameter. Further, any learning algorithm
that outputs a Boolean function is uniform RO prediction stable at the trivial rate 1. Hence to
ensure that the additional error in Lemma 4.5 is at most α we need to amplify the stability to α · ǫ.
This requires r = 1/(αǫ) subsamples. Therefore overall we obtain the following general reduction
for agnostic learning of Boolean function.
Corollary 4.7. Let C be a class of Boolean functions over X. Let A be an agnostic learning
algorithm for C that uses m(α, β) samples to learn with excess error α and confidence parameter β.
For every ǫ ∈ (0, 1], there exists an ǫ-differentially private prediction algorithm M that agnostically
learns C given n = 2 ·m(α/2, 2βαǫ)/(αǫ) examples.
As in the case of PAC learning, this reduction allows us to upper bound the sample complexity
of private prediction for agnostic learning of C. Specifically, n = O
(
d+log(1/β)
α2
)
samples suffice to
agnostically learn a class VC dimension d (e.g. [SSBD14]). Plugging this into our reduction we get:
Corollary 4.8 (Cor. 2.3 restated). Let C be a class of Boolean functions of VC dimension d. Then
for all α, β, ǫ ∈ (0, 1] there exists an ǫ-differentially private prediction algorithm M that agnostically
learns C with excess error α and confidence 1− β given n = O
(
d+log(1/(αβǫ))
ǫα3
)
examples.
4.4 Applications to convex regression problems
We now apply this general approach to convex regression problems. Specifically, problems of the
form:
min
w∈K E(x,y)∼P
[ℓ(f(w, x), y)],
whereK ⊂ Rd is some convex body and ℓ(f(·, x), y) is a convex function over K for all (x, y) ∈ X×Y .
For simplicity, we will restrict our attention to the case when K is a subset of the Euclidean ball
of radius R which we denote by Bd2(R). Several classes of such problems are known to be solvable
efficiently by uniform RO prediction stable algorithms. Our result will be based on the following
upper bound on prediction stability of strongly convex optimization that is implicit in [BE02;
SSSSS10].
Theorem 4.9 ([SSSSS10]). Let K ⊆ Bd2(R) be a convex body, {f(·, x) | x ∈ X} be a family of
Lf -Lipschitz functions over K, ℓ : R×Y → R be convex, Lℓ-Lipschitz loss function and ℓ(f(·, x), y)
be λ-strongly convex for all (x, y) ∈ X×Y . For a dataset S ∈ (X×Y )n let wS denote the empirical
minimizer of loss on S: wS = argminw∈K
∑
(x,y)∈S [ℓ(f(w, x), y)]. Then the algorithm that given
S, outputs a function f(wS , ·) is uniform RO prediction stable with rate 4L
2
f ·Lℓ
λn . Further, for every
distribution P over X × Y :
E
S∼Pn
[
E
P
[ℓ(f(wS , x), y)]
]
≤ min
w∈KEP
[ℓ(f(w, x), y)] +
4L2f · L2ℓ
λn
.
We remark that this version may appear somewhat different from the results in [SSSSS10] as
they consider a single convex loss function with Lipshitz constant L that gives the loss of the model
with parameter w on an example. Our statement follows from noting that their work proves that
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for any pair of datasets S and S′ that differ in a single element, ‖wS − wS′‖2 ≤ 4Lλn . This implies
that for all x,
|f(wS , x)− f(wS′ , x)| ≤
4L · Lf
λn
≤ 4L
2
f · Lℓ
λn
.
By combining this result with Lemma 4.5 we get the following private prediction algorithm.
Corollary 4.10. Let K ⊆ Bd2(R) be a convex body, {f(·, x) | x ∈ X} be a family of Lf -Lipschitz
functions over K, ℓ : R×Y → R be convex, Lℓ-Lipschitz loss function and ℓ(f(·, x), y) be λ-strongly
convex for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y . For every ǫ > 0, there exists an ǫ-differentially private prediction
algorithm M that for any probability distribution P over X × Y satisfies:
E
S∼Pn
[EP [ℓ(M(S))]] ≤ min
w∈KEP
[ℓ(f(w, x), y)] +
4L2f · L2ℓ
λn
·
(
1 +
1
ǫ
)
.
Corollary 4.10 requires strong convexity to obtain meaningful guarantees. However, as pointed
out in [SSSSS10], it is possible to add a strongly convex regularizing term λ‖w‖2 to the objective
function that has sufficiently small effect on the loss function while ensuring stability (and gener-
alization). Specifically, by setting λ =
2LfLℓ
R
√
nǫ/(1+ǫ)
the objective function will change by at most
2RLfLℓ√
nǫ/(1+ǫ)
since w is assumed to be in a ball of radius R. Plugging this value of λ into Corollary
4.10 and accounting for the additional error we get:
Corollary 4.11. Let K ⊆ Bd2(R) be a convex body, {f(·, x) | x ∈ X} be a family of Lf -Lipschitz
functions over K, ℓ : R × Y → R be convex, Lℓ-Lipschitz loss function and ℓ(f(·, x), y) be convex
for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y . For every ǫ > 0, there exists an ǫ-differentially private prediction algorithm
M that for any probability distribution P over X × Y satisfies:
E
S∼Pn
[EP [ℓ(M(S))]] ≤ min
w∈KEP
[ℓ(f(w, x), y)] +
4 · R · Lf · Lℓ√
nǫ/(1 + ǫ)
.
Somewhat stronger results can be obtained for regression problems in which the loss function
is also smooth. In this case we can rely on the stability of gradient descent for smooth functions
implicit in [HRS16]. This result applies to the projected stochastic gradient descent algorithm. For
concreteness, let PSGDη denote the algorithm that starting from w0 being the origin, performs the
following iterative updates for every i ∈ [n]:
wi+1 ← ProjK(wi + η · ∇ℓ(f(wi, xi), yi)),
where ProjK denotes projection to K. The algorithm returns the average iterate: w¯S .= 1n
∑
i∈[n]wi.
Theorem 4.12 ([HRS16]). Let K ⊆ Bd2(R) be a convex body, {f(·, x) | x ∈ X} be a family of
Lf -Lipschitz functions over K, ℓ : R×Y → R be convex, Lℓ-Lipschitz loss function and ℓ(f(·, x), y)
be convex and σ-smooth for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y . For a dataset S ∈ (X × Y )n let w¯S denote the
output of PSGDη for η = R/(LfLℓ
√
n). If σ ≤ 2/η then the algorithm that outputs f(w¯S , ·) is
uniform RO prediction stable with rate RLf/
√
n. Further, for every distribution P over X × Y :
E
S∼Pn
[
E
P
[ℓ(f(wS , x), y)]
]
≤ min
w∈KEP
[ℓ(f(w, x), y)] +
2Lf · Lℓ · R√
n
.
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Plugging this result into our framework we obtain the following stronger bound for convex and
smooth functions. We will also additionally assume that the loss function ℓ(·, y) is σℓ-smooth in
the first parameter for all y.
Corollary 4.13. Let K ⊆ Bd2(R) be a convex body, {f(·, x) | x ∈ X} be a family of Lf -Lipschitz
functions over K, ℓ : R×Y → R be convex, Lℓ-Lipschitz and σℓ-smooth loss function and ℓ(f(·, x), y)
be convex and σ-smooth for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y . If σ ≤ 2LfLℓ
√
n/R then for every ǫ > 0, there
exists an ǫ-differentially private prediction algorithm M that for any probability distribution P over
X × Y satisfies:
E
S∼Pn
[EP [ℓ(M(S))]] ≤ min
w∈KEP
[ℓ(f(w, x), y)] +
2 · R · Lf · Lℓ√
n
+
σℓ ·R2 · L2f
nǫ2
.
One way to interpret this result is that for sufficiently smooth loss functions, the error caused
by noise become comparable to the statistical error when ǫ scales as n−1/4. In other words, this
level of differential privacy is obtained essentially for free. We also remark that the assumption
that ℓ(·, y) is σℓ-smooth can also be used in Cor. 4.11 to obtain the same bound (up to a constant)
as the one we got in Cor. 4.13. Similarly, without this assumption Cor. 4.13 would give essentially
the same bound as Cor. 4.11.
5 Learning of thresholds and unions of intervals
We demonstrate a nearly optimal algorithm for agnostically learning the class of threshold functions
on a line (and more generally unions of intervals). For N ∈ N we consider threshold functions over
[N ]. Specifically, for a ∈ [N + 1], let θa denote the threshold function “x ≥ a” over [N ] and let
ThrN denote the set of all N + 1 threshold functions over [N ]. More generally, we define a union
of intervals by an increasing sequence of interval ends. Specifically, for an increasing sequence of
integer numbers 1 ≤ a1 < a2 < · · · < ak ≤ N + 1, we define θa[k] to be the function defined as
follows: given x ∈ M let t(x) be the largest index such that x ≥ at. Then θa[k](x) is equal to 1 if
and only if t is odd. We denote by ThrN,k the class of all functions of this type.
Our algorithm, referred to as the exponential projected walk, is described below. For conve-
nience, we assume that the dataset S = (x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn) is given in a sorted order, that is
xi ≤ xj for all i < j. Further, we define Proj[A,B](x) as the projection of x onto interval [A,B].
We first prove that for any setting of parameters and n, the exponential projected walk is an
ǫ-differentially private prediction algorithm.
Lemma 5.1. For any n, T ∈ N, ǫ > 0, ExpPW(T, ǫ) is an ǫ-differentially private prediction
algorithm.
Proof. Let S = (x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn) be a dataset in a sorted order and let S
′ be a dataset that
differs from S in a single element. There exist indices i and j such that S′ can be seen as removing
the example i and then inserting example (x′, y′) into j-th position so that the resulting sequence
of examples is still in the sorted order. Let S−i denote S with i-th element removed. We will prove
that for any x, D∞(M(S, x)‖M(S−i, x)) ≤ ǫ/2 and D∞(M(S−i, x)‖M(S, x)) ≤ ǫ/2. Note that, by
removing element j from S′ we also obtain S−i. Hence our argument will imply that
D∞(M(S, x)‖M(S′, x)) ≤ D∞(M(S, x)‖M(S−i, x)) +D∞(M(S−i, x)‖M(S′, x)) ≤ ǫ.
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Parameters: T, ǫ
Input: dataset S = ((x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)) ∈ ([N ]× {0, 1})n in sorted order and a point x
i = 0, v0 = 0
while xi ≤ x do:
i++
v′i = vi−1 + (2yi − 1)
vi = Proj[−T,T ](v′i)
t = i
Sample b from Bernoulli distribution with bias e
ǫ·vt/2
1+eǫ·vt/2
.
Output b
Figure 1: ExpPW(T, ǫ): Exponential projected walk algorithm
LetM denote ExpPW(T, ǫ) and let V (S, x) denote the value of vt at the end of runningM(S, x).
Note that in order to prove the claim it is sufficient to prove that |V (S, x) − V (S−i, x)| ≤ 1. As
in the proof of Theorem 4.1, the claim then follows immediately from the definition of the output
distribution of ExpPW being as: output 1 with probability e
ǫ·V (S,x)/2
1+eǫ·V (S,x)/2
and 0 with probability
1
1+eǫ·V (S,x)/2
.
To show that |V (S, x)− V (S−i, x)| ≤ 1 we observe that: for x < xi removal of (xi, yi) does not
affect the output of the algorithm. Hence V (S, x) = V (S−i, x). For x ≥ xi the values v0, . . . , vn of
the walk on S will have an additional step of length at most 1 at index i. After that step the update
points (xi+1, yi+1), . . . , (xt, yt) will be identical for both sequences. Performing such an update step
on two different values u and v does not increase the distance between the values. Hence at the
end of the walk we obtain that |V (S, x)− V (S−i, x)| ≤ |V (S, xi)− V (S−i, xi)| ≤ 1.
We now prove that our algorithm will achieve low empirical error. Let
ErrS(M(S))
.
=
1
n
∑
i∈[n]
Pr
M
[M(S, xi) 6= yi]
and for a class of functions C let OptS(C)
.
= minf∈C ErrS(f).
Lemma 5.2. Let S = (x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn) ∈ ([N ] × {0, 1})n be a set of n examples. Then for
M = ExpPW(T, ǫ),
ErrS(M(S)) ≤ OptS(ThrN,k) + (k + 2)T/n + e−ǫT/2.
Proof. As before, we assume that examples in S are in the sorted order. Let V (S, x) denote the
value of vt at the end of running M(S, x). Let f ∈ ThrN,k be the interval function with the lowest
error on S and let a[k] = a1, . . . , ak be its parameters.
We first deal with points xi such that V (S, xi) ∈ {−T, T}. We denote the set of indices of these
points by I. Observe that if V (S, xi) = T then yi = 1. This is true since for yi = 0 the projected walk
makes a −1 step and then projects to [−T, T ]. Such step cannot end in V (S, xi) = T . Similarly, if
V (S, xi) = −T then yi = 0. This means that for i ∈ I, PrM [M(S, xi) 6= yi] = 1/(eǫT/2+1) ≤ e−ǫT/2.
Consequently,
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∑
i∈I
Pr
M
[M(S, xi) 6= yi] ≤ |I| · e−ǫT/2. (4)
We now split the examples into bands according to the endpoints of the step that the projected
walk took on them. Specifically, for v ∈ {−T,−T + 1, . . . , T − 1} let Iv be the set of indices i
such that either V (S, xi−1) = v and V (S, xi) = v + 1 or V (S, xi−1) = v + 1 and V (S, xi) = v. Let
J
.
=
⋃
−T≤v≤T−1 Iv. Note that for u 6= v, Iu ∩ Iv = ∅ but I−T and IT−1 may include some of the
points in I. Also the collection of these sets covers all the indices: I ∪ J = [n].
We make several simple observations about examples with indices in Iv. Let i1 < i2 < · · · < iℓ
be the indices of points in Iv. The labels of points have to alternate, or yij 6= yij+1 for all j ∈ [ℓ−1].
This is due to the fact that the walk cannot traverse the interval of values [v, v + 1] twice in a row
in the same direction. We use this to compute the total error of both M and f on points with
indices in Iv.
If yij = 1 then the projected walk made +1 step at ij and therefore PrM [M(S, xij ) 6= yij ] =
1/(eǫ(v+1)/2 + 1). While if yij = 0 then the projected walk made −1 step at ij and therefore
PrM [M(S, xij ) 6= yij ] = eǫv/2/(eǫv/2 + 1). Note that
1/(eǫ(v+1)/2 + 1) + eǫv/2/(eǫv/2 + 1) ≤ 1.
Therefore for any pair of points with opposite labels the sum of expected errors is at most 1. The
alternation of labels for examples in Iv then implies that
∑
i∈Iv
Pr
M
[M(S, xi) 6= yi] =
∑
j∈[ℓ]
Pr
M
[M(S, xij ) 6= yij ] ≤
|Iv|+ 1
2
, (5)
where the additional 1 is the bound on the probability of error on a point that has no pair with
the opposite label (which happens when the size of Iv is odd).
Now consider the error of f = θa[k] on points in Iv. Note that f splits [N ] into at most k + 1
intervals where the value of f is constant. For r ∈ [k + 1] let Jr denote the r-th interval and
Iv,r
.
= Iv ∩ Jr. The alternation of labels in Iv implies that the number of points with indices in Iv,r
on which f is correct can be larger than the number of points on which f is wrong by at most 1.
That is: ∑
i∈Iv,r
|f(xi)− yi| ≥ |Iv,r| − 1
2
.
Hence
∑
i∈Iv
|f(xi)− yi| =
∑
r∈[k+1]
∑
i∈Iv,r
|f(xi)− yi| ≥
∑
r∈[k+1]
|Iv,r| − 1
2
=
|Iv| − k − 1
2
. (6)
Combining the inequalities (5) and (6), we obtain that
∑
i∈Iv
Pr
M
[M(S, xi) 6= yi] ≤
∑
i∈Iv
|f(xi)− yi|+ k + 2
2
.
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Summing up over all values of v ∈ {−T,−T + 1, . . . , T − 1} we get∑
i∈J
Pr
M
[M(S, xi) 6= yi] =
∑
v∈{−T,−T+1,...,T−1}
∑
i∈Iv
Pr
M
[M(S, xi) 6= yi]
≤
∑
v∈{−T,−T+1,...,T−1}
(∑
i∈Iv
|f(xi)− yi|
)
+
k + 2
2
=
∑
i∈J
|f(xi)− yi|+ 2T (k + 2)
2
≤ n · ErrS(f) + T (k + 2)
Finally, I ∪ J = [n] and therefore combining this with equation (4) we get:
ErrS(M(S)) ≤ 1
n
(∑
i∈J
Pr
M
[M(S, xi) 6= yi] +
∑
i∈I
Pr
M
[M(S, xi) 6= yi]
)
≤ ErrS(f) + T (k + 2)
n
+
|I|
n
· e−ǫT/2
≤ OptS(ThrN,k) +
T (k + 2)
n
+ e−ǫT/2.
Now by choosing T = ⌈2 ln(2/α)/ǫ⌉ we can ensure that the empirical error of ExpPW(T, ǫ)
is close to the best possible by a function in ThrN,k. To prove that our algorithm generalizes we
appeal to generalization properties of differentially private prediction described in Section 6.
Theorem 5.3 (subsumes Thm. 2.4). For any α, ǫ > 0 and k,N ∈ N, T = ⌈2 ln(2/α)/ǫ⌉ let
M
.
= ExpPW(T, ǫ). Then M is an ǫ-differentially private prediction algorithm and given n ≥
4(k+2) ln(2/α)
αǫ examples from an arbitrary distribution P over [N ]× {0, 1} its output satisfies:
E
S∼Pn
[ErrP(M(S))] ≤ eǫ · (OptP(ThrN,k) + α).
In particular, setting ǫ = α/2 we get that for n = O(k ln(1/α)/α2)
E
S∼Pn
[ErrP(M(S))] ≤ OptP(ThrN,k) + α.
Further, if OptP(ThrN,k) = 0 and ǫ ≤ 1/(16 ln(1/β)), then for every β ∈ (0, 1),
Pr
S∼Pn
[ErrP(M(S)) ≥ 3α] ≤ 2β.
Proof. Evaluation of the disagreement error |M(S, x)− y| is ǫ-differentially private for all x and y.
Therefore we can apply Lemma 6.4 to obtain:
E
S∼Pn
[ErrP(M(S))] = E
S,S′∼Pn
[ErrS′(M(S))] ≤ eǫ · E
S∼Pn
[ErrS(M(S))] .
By applying Lemma 5.2 we get that
E
S∼Pn
[ErrS(M(S))] ≤ E
S∼Pn
[OptS(ThrN,k)] + (k + 2)T/n + e
−ǫT/2 ≤ E
S∼Pn
[OptS(ThrN,k)] + α.
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Finally, we recall a well known fact that for any class C and n, ES∼Pn [OptS(C)] ≤ OptP(C). Hence,
E
S∼Pn
[ErrS(M(S))] ≤ eǫ ·
(
E
S∼Pn
[OptS(ThrN,k)] + α
)
≤ eǫ · (OptP(ThrN,k) + α).
To establish the high probability bounds for the realizable case, we note that if OptP(ThrN,k) = 0
then for every S that includes only the elements in the support of P, OptS(ThrN,k) = 0. Hence
ErrS(M(S)) ≤ α. Now applying Lemma 6.5, we obtain:
Pr
S,S′∼Pn
[
ErrS′(M(S)) ≥ α · e2
√
ǫ ln(1/β)
]
≤ β.
Using the condition that ǫ ≤ 1/(16 ln(1/β)), we get that e2
√
ǫ ln(1/β) ≤ e1/2 ≤ 2. Hence
Pr
S,S′∼Pn
[ErrS′(M(S)) ≥ 2α] ≤ β.
Now if for some S, ErrP(M(S)) ≥ 3α, then using the fact that ErrS′(M(S)) is the mean of n
independent Bernoulli random variables with bias ErrP(M(S)), we get that with high probability
ErrS′(M(S)) ≥ 2α. Specifically, by Chernoff bound, for n ≥ 6 ln(2)/α (which is satisfied by the
conditions of our theorem),
Pr
S′∼Pn
[ErrS′(M(S)) ≥ 2α] ≥ 1/2.
Thus
β ≥ Pr
S,S′∼Pn
[ErrS′(M(S)) ≥ 2α] ≥ 1
2
Pr
S∼Pn
[ErrP(M(S)) ≥ 3α] .
Our generalization results in Section 6 are not strong enough to prove that our algorithm has
low expected error with high probability over S in the agnostic case (while having asymptotically
optimal sample complexity). Establishing such a result is an interesting open problem.
6 Stability and Generalization
We now view prediction privacy as a notion of stability and derive generalization properties of
private prediction algorithms. Our results will be stated for a somewhat more general class of
algorithms that compute any function of a single data point while satisfying differential privacy.
Definition 6.1 (Private evaluation algorithm). Let M be an algorithm that given a dataset S ∈ Zn
and a value z ∈ Z produces a value in a set W . We say that M is an (ǫ, δ)-differentially private
evaluation algorithm if for every z ∈ Z, the output M(S, z) is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private with respect
to S.
In our application the algorithm M will be computing the loss of the prediction produced on
S by a prediction algorithm M ′. Namely, Z = X × Y and for some loss function ℓ, M(S, (x, y)) =
ℓ(M ′(S, x), y). Note that by the postprocessing property of differential privacy (e.g. [DR14]), this
evaluation is differentially private with the same parameters. We state this formally below.
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Lemma 6.2 (Postprocessing). For Z = X×Y letM ′ : Zn×X → R be an (ǫ, δ)-differentially private
prediction algorithm. Then for every loss function ℓ : R × Y → R, M(S, (x, y)) .= ℓ(M ′(S, x), y) is
an (ǫ, δ)-differentially private evaluation algorithm.
We will need the following simple property of Dδ∞ to argue about closeness of expectations.
Lemma 6.3 (e.g.[FS17]). Let U and V be two random variables over [0, B] such that Dδ∞(U‖V ) ≤ ǫ.
Then E[U ] ≤ eǫ ·E[V ] + δ ·B.
Let S = (z1, z2, . . . , zn) and S
′ = (z′1, z
′
2, . . . , z
′
n) be two sequences of samples drawn randomly
and independently from some unknown distribution P over Z. We consider the relationship be-
tween the empirical mean of a differentially private evaluation algorithm and its mean on inde-
pendently drawn samples, namely between ES[M(S)] .= 1n
∑
i∈[n]EM [M(S, zi)] and ES′ [M(S)] =
1
n
∑
i∈[n]EM [M(S, z
′
i)]. Clearly,
E
S′∼Pn
[ES′ [M(S)]] = E
z∼P, M
[M(S, z)] = EP [M(S)].
Moreover, standard concentration inequalities implies that ES′ [M(S)] is strongly concentrated
around EP [M(S)]. Therefore our bounds on ES′ [M(S)] readily imply bounds on EP [M(S)] while
being easier to state. Note that for M(S, (x, y)) = ℓ(M ′(S, x), y), ES [M(S)] = ES [ℓ(M ′(S))] and
EP [M(S)] = EP [ℓ(M ′(S))], in other words these are exactly the empirical and the expected loss of
the predictor given by M ′. We give the following bound on the k-th moment of ES′ [M(S)].
Lemma 6.4. Let M : Zn × Z → [0, B] be an (ǫ, δ)-differentially private evaluation algorithm and
P be an arbitrary distribution over Z. Then:
E
S,S′∼Pn
[
(ES′ [M(S)])k
]
≤ ek2·ǫ · E
S∼Pn
[
(ES [M(S)] + kδB)k
]
Proof. For a sequence of k indices I = (i1, . . . , ik) ∈ [n]k let SI denote S with every element with
index in I replaced with the corresponding element of S′. Namely, for each i, if exists j such that
i = ij, then zi is replaced with z
′
i. Now, observe that
E
S,S′∼Pn



 1
n
∑
i∈[n]
E
M
[M(S, z′i)]


k

 = 1
nk
∑
I∈[n]k
E
S,S′∼Pn
[∏
i∈I
E
M
[M(S, z′i)]
]
. (7)
Using group privacy (Lem. 3.1) we know that Dke
ǫ(k−1)δ∞ (M(SI , z′i)‖M(S, z′i)) ≤ ǫk. Using
Lemma 6.3 we obtain that
E
M
[M(S, z′i)] ≤ eǫk
(
E
M
[M(SI , z
′
i)] + kδB
)
.
Consequently, ∏
i∈I
E
M
[M(S, z′i)] ≤ ek
2·ǫ ·
∏
i∈I
(
E
M
[M(SI , z
′
i)] + kδB
)
.
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Observe that for S, S′ ∼ Pn,∏i∈I (EM [M(SI , z′i)] + kδB) is distributed identically to∏i∈I (EM [M(S, zi)] + kδB).
Substituting this into equation (7) we get
E
S,S′∼Pn



 1
n
∑
i∈[n]
E
M
[M(S, z′i)]


k

 ≤ ek2·ǫ · 1
nk
∑
I∈[n]k
E
S∼Pn
[∏
i∈I
(
E
M
[M(S, zi)] + kδB
)]
= ek
2·ǫ · E
S∼Pn



 1
n
∑
i∈[n]
E
M
[M(S, zi)] + kδB


k

 .
We now give a simple example of how to obtain high probability generalization bounds from
Lemma 6.4. For simplicity we consider only the case where ES [M(S)] is upper bounded by a fixed
value α and δ = 0 (such as in our application for realizable learning in Theorem 5.3). It can be
extended relatively easily to the case then such bound holds with sufficiently high probability and
δ > 0.
Lemma 6.5. Let M : Zn×Z → R+ be an ǫ-differentially private evaluation algorithm and P be an
arbitrary distribution over Z. Assume that for every S, ES [M(S)] ≤ α. Then for every β ∈ (0, 1),
Pr
S,S′∼Pn
[
ES′ [M(S)] ≥ α · e2
√
ǫ ln(1/β)
]
≤ β.
Proof. By Markov’s inequality and Lemma 6.4, for every t ≥ 1
Pr
S,S′∼Pn
[
ES′ [M(S)] ≥ t · α · ekǫ
]
= Pr
S,S′∼Pn
[
(ES′ [M(S)])k ≥
(
t · α · ekǫ
)k]
≤
ES,S′∼Pn
[
(ES′ [M(S)])k
]
(t · α · ekǫ)k
≤
ek
2·ǫ · ES∼Pn
[
(ES [M(S)])k
]
(t · α · ekǫ)k
≤ e
k2·ǫ · αk
(t · α · ekǫ)k
≤ t−k.
Setting k =
√
ln(1/β)/ǫ and t = β−1/k, we obtain that t−k = β and
t · α · ekǫ = α · eln(1/β)/
√
ln(1/β)/ǫ · eǫ·
√
ln(1/β)/ǫ = α · e2
√
ǫ ln(1/β).
7 Discussion
Several recent works point out risks to the privacy of personal data used to train a predictive model
even when the attacker is given only black-box access to the model [SSSS17; CLKES18; Lon+18].
22
In a number of application such access is provided via a prediction interface. While the risks can be
mitigated by training the model in a differentially private way [CLKES18], known theoretical and
practical results show that this may substantially reduce the accuracy of the model (e.g. [BST14]).
In this work we formulated and examined an alternative approach that only aims to ensure that the
predictions themselves are differentially private. Further, we focused on understanding of making
a single prediction with differential privacy (on an arbitrarily chosen point).
As we have demonstrated, simple privacy-preserving aggregation of labels created by non-private
models allows to avoid some of the overheads of training the model differentially privately. Most
notably, it removes the dependence on the dimension of the data for some classification and regres-
sion problems. Further, we show that algorithms satisfying uniform prediction stability can be used
to reduce the overheads of aggregation. Yet, it appears that for many problems, privacy-preserving
aggregation leads to a suboptimal algorithm. We therefore ask which other algorithmic approaches
can be used to address the problem. Our algorithm for learning thresholds gives an example of
an approach that improves on the aggregation-based learning. Finding a more general approach
to agnostic learning with prediction privacy that achieves optimal sample complexity is a natural
open problem.
Differentially private prediction is also a natural notion of stability. We demonstrate that
it leads to (relatively) strong generalization guarantees and exploit these results to analyze our
algorithm for learning thresholds. Still, the guarantees we prove are not as strong as those proved
for models trained with differentially privacy. An interesting open problem is whether our results
can be improved. Specifically, whether the factor e
√
ǫ in Lemma 6.5 can be improved to eO(ǫ).
A learning algorithm that ensures differential privacy of a single prediction would be suitable
for applications in which each user asks few queries and it can be assumed that users do not share
their predictions. Finding approaches for dealing with multiple prediction queries (that go beyond
the composition properties of differential privacy) is an important direction for further research
(in the context of privacy-preserving aggregation this question has been considered in several work
described in Section 2.4).
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